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Family Values Reconsidered: A Response 
 
Harry Brighouse 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
 
Adam Swift 
University of Warwick 
Abstract:  
We respond to six critiques of our book Family Values: The Ethics of Parent-Child 
Relationships. Replying to Gheaus, we emphasize the limited and illustrative role 
given to the principle of fair equality of opportunity while, unlike Macleod, doubting 
that a just society could eliminate entirely the conflict between it and the family. In 
response to Sypnowich we clarify the ways in which our account is and is not 
perfectionist and, prompted by Cormier, acknowledge some lack of clarity in our 
views about parents’ rights to shape their children’s values. We sound cautionary 
notes about Weinstock’s view that the promotion of autonomy can be left to schools, 
and offer a more positive take on the value of childhood than that proposed by 
Hannan and Leland. 
 
Keywords: Family ethics; social justice; parents' rights; children's rights; childhood; 
equality of opportunity; education. 
 
It is wonderful to receive so much careful attention. But it’s also frustrating. Each 
paper poses important questions, and between them they cover a wide range of issues. 
It is challenging, on such big topics, and in so few words, simultaneously to set the 
record straight, to identify the various objections posed by our critics, and to respond 
to them in a way likely to advance our collective understanding of the issues. Still, 
here goes. 
 
The Family and equality 
In our book we, like a number of other theorists, frame the relationship between the 
family and justice in terms of a principle of equal opportunity. Rawls’s interpretation 
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of fair equal opportunity requires that people with similar native talents and 
willingness to use them should face roughly equal prospects for attaining valuable 
positions and the powers and prerogatives attached to them: 
The consistent application of the principle of fair opportunity requires us to 
view persons independently from the influences of their social position. But 
how far should this tendency be carried? It seems that even when fair 
opportunity (as it has been defined) is satisfied, the family will lead to unequal 
chances between individuals. Is the family to be abolished then? 
 
His answer is that ‘taken by itself and given a certain primacy, the idea of equal 
opportunity inclines in this direction’ (1971, p.511). Only the invocation of his other 
principles prevents this counter-intuitive result.  
Anca Gheaus’s paper (201x) is devoted to showing that even abolishing the 
family would not produce fair equality of opportunity. Colin Macleod (201x), by 
contrast, argues that the conflict between fair equality of opportunity and the family is 
less serious than we acknowledge. Both deny that fair equality of opportunity 
supports abolition, though in rather different ways. For Gheaus, it’s because there will 
be unfair inequality of opportunity even with abolition, for Macleod it’s because fair 
equality of opportunity can be achieved without it.  We agree with Gheaus that 
alternative childrearing arrangements, and other forms of partiality, would continue to 
produce unfair inequalities of opportunity but we suspect that the latter would be 
considerably reduced. Macleod is right that in principle it is possible to reconcile the 
two, but we doubt that a just society would eliminate the conflict entirely.  
It is important to see that fair equality of opportunity plays a strategic role in 
the exposition of our view: we employ it as the conventional example of the kind of 
impartial distributive principle with which familial partiality conflicts. We might have 
chosen other principles instead, perhaps a thoroughgoing luck egalitarianism, or a 
variant of prioritarianism such as the difference principle, or even a form of 
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sufficientarianism. All of these can make demands on parents that seem to compete 
with their permissions, or even their obligations, to favour their children rather than 
others. Our aim was to identify the kinds of partiality that can be justified specifically 
by appeal to the value of the parent-child relationship, and our analysis would have 
been the same in all these cases.  
Fair equality of opportunity seemed to us the strategic choice partly because of 
the way the Rawlsian frame has tended to structure academic discussion and partly 
because of that principle’s wider intuitive appeal. Our aim was to identify a set of 
‘relationship goods’, and kinds of parent-child interaction productive of those goods, 
that should not be sacrificed to it despite that appeal, while arguing that the principle 
was important enough plausibly to constrain parents’ attempts to confer advantage on 
their children in general. These expository benefits, for us, outweighed the principle’s 
many defects, such as its limited specifications both of those whose opportunities 
should be equal and what those opportunities should be opportunities for, or the fact 
that our actual circumstances confront us with more urgent, impartially justified, 
distributive demands than those required by the principle (Brighouse and Swift 2014, 
pp. 38-44, 143-45).  
We argue that even if abolishing the family would result in fair equality of 
opportunity, abolition would not be justified, because the family provides important 
goods that are, from the impartial perspective, more important than fair equality of 
opportunity. So, if abolishing the family would not – even if it could not – make 
equality of opportunity possible, that does not affect our argument. According to 
Gheaus (xxx), our analysis ‘seems to rely on the assumption that, absent the family 
and other things being equal, there would be significantly less disruption of 
distributive justice’. If so, appearances are deceptive.  
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We make no empirical assumption of that kind. More, we do not suppose that 
familial partiality is the only kind of partiality that is legitimate, nor even that it is the 
kind of legitimate partiality that is, empirically, most likely to disrupt fair equality of 
opportunity. Our aim is to show that parent-child relationships justify less conferral of 
advantage than is commonly thought, and provide less by way of justified opposition 
to egalitarian policies than is commonly acknowledged. It is compatible with this that 
other relationships might justify extensive partiality of a kind that interfered with fair 
equality of opportunity, and that justified resistance to egalitarian policies. To 
investigate whether other forms of relationship, such as friendship or compatriotism 
or co-religiosity, would justify such interference and resistance one would need, on 
our approach, to consider the specificity of those relationships and think about what 
kinds of partiality might be defended by appeal to the goods they produce.1 It is true 
that we, like many others, regard the familial case as generating particularly important 
permissions and requirements, and we are doubtful that careful examination of the 
goods produced by these other relationships will show their production to legitimate 
extensive expressions of partiality of the kind that would disrupt fair equality of 
opportunity – or other impartial principles. But our book does not take a stand on that, 
separate, question.2 
Nothing in our view denies that, in the absence of the family, people would act 
in ways just as disruptive of fair equality of opportunity as they do in its presence. 
Perhaps, deprived of their ability to confer advantage on their children, people might 
be even more keenly motivated to benefit their friends, their compatriots or their co-
religionists. Similarly, for our (limited, specific) purposes, one does not need to know 
                                                        
1 Which is not to say that all partiality must be justified by appeal to relationship 
goods of any kind. See Brighouse and Swift (2015, pp.224-225). 
2 For a sketch of how an investigation of the compatriot case would go, see Brighouse 
and Swift (2011). 
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if ‘alternative childrearing institutions would be significantly less likely to disrupt fair 
distributions than a (properly reformed) family’ (Gheaus: xx).  
When thinking about this empirical counterfactual, one must keep clear that a 
‘properly reformed’ family would already be likely to be less disruptive (though not, 
perhaps, less likely to be disruptive) of that principle than the family as it exists at 
moment. (If, as Macleod and we suggest, the wider society were also subject to 
egalitarian reform, that would do even more to reduce the conflict.) We certainly 
agree with Gheaus that any system of childrearing that might plausibly serve the 
relevant interests at all well could not, for the reasons she gives, be expected to give 
all children equality of opportunity for jobs and the rewards that attach to them. There 
would of course be innumerable contingencies at the individual level – some adults 
will just be a better fit with some children – but how much inequality of opportunity 
could be expected will depend on a number of variables, particularly, perhaps, the 
extent of variation in the relevant adults’ child rearing capacities (which we assume 
would be less than between parents in even the properly reformed family), and the 
number of children each adult would raise over her lifetime (which we assume would 
be more).3 Given less variation in parenting input and less exclusive attention to 
particular children, we hazard that a system of the kind she has in mind would tend to 
produce less inequality of opportunity than even a properly reformed family. It is an 
interesting, and different, question what kinds of partiality could be justified by appeal 
to the adult-child relationships in question. The first step in thinking about that would 
                                                        
3 It is an interesting issue the extent to which inequality of opportunity matters 
because it reflects systematic unfairness, and unfairness that is likely to be reproduced 
over generations. For some kinds of egalitarian, random variation in individuals’ 
upbringings might be a less objectionable source of such inequality than even the 
properly reformed family.  
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be to clarify the nature of those relationships, especially how exactly they differ from 
the parent-child relationship in the properly reformed family.4 
Macleod is surely right that there is no necessary conflict between the family 
and fair equality of opportunity. One way to see this is simply to imagine a society in 
which children are raised in families but there is no overall inequality in the rewards, 
both intrinsic (e.g. self-realization) and extrinsic (e.g. income), that attach to different 
jobs; there would still be different jobs and children would doubtless have unequal 
chances of achieving them, but there would be no inequality of prospects with respect 
to rewards. Or suppose that jobs were unequally rewarded but people were allocated 
to them randomly, or by other mechanisms that rendered irrelevant the way they had 
been raised as children. These possibilities suffice to establish his claim, though he 
has in mind a different reconciliatory, less outlandish, scenario: a ‘non-hierarchical 
community’ in which parents are more equal with respect to childrearing ability and 
motivation, public institutions help to mitigate any residual inequalities in children’s 
competences, and a wide range of different skills are valued by society.  
Macleod very nicely brings out the contingency of the empirical differences 
and inequalities that in fact generate the conflict between the family and fair equality 
                                                        
4 Even though we at no point advocate abolition - indeed the book is written as a 
defence of the family - Gheaus worries that our approach risks alienating and 
antagonizing readers in a way damaging to the prospects for egalitarian reform. This 
raises general issues about philosophers’ responsibility to anticipate how their ideas 
might be (mis)understood and (mis)used that we cannot address here. For what it’s 
worth, such opprobrium as we have received has made no reference to our mention of 
abolition. It has focused rather on the suggestion that parents should occasionally 
have in mind the way in which even entirely legitimate activities like reading bedtime 
stories can have the effect of leaving other children at an unfair disadvantage, which 
has been misunderstood as condemning parents who read such stories. When ideas are 
prone to that level of distortion, it is hard to see what would be gained by more 
extensive attention to the possibilities of polemical misrepresentation. Those 




of opportunity. Where we emphasized that contingency especially with respect to 
children’s outcomes (Brighouse and Swift 2014, pp. 129-130), he mainly focuses on 
parental – and other - inputs. Still, we doubt that the family and fair equality of 
opportunity could be entirely reconciled in a just society, because we think that justice 
requires the permission of at least somewhat unequal inputs and outcomes. Indeed, 
fair equality of opportunity itself is plausibly construed as requiring that permission.5 
Although strictly speaking that principle is entirely negative, objecting solely to 
people’s prospects being affected by their social class background, it is normally 
understood also as permitting, and on some interpretations even requiring, that those 
prospects indeed be influenced by their natural talents and willingness to use them. In 
any case, any plausible specification of the principle will leave individuals, however 
equal their prospects, free to make choices – about what kind of work to do, for 
example, or how hard to work, or how to spend their leisure time (Brighouse and 
Swift 2014, p.30). At least some of those choices will properly leave them unequal, or 
at least different, with respect to attributes that may legitimately affect their 
interactions with their children in ways that it is in practice impossible to prevent 
from impacting somewhat on those children’s prospects, if their children’s own 
freedom to make choices, when capable of so doing, is also to be respected. 
We might put it this way. Nothing about family values prevents the 
achievement of fair equality of opportunity. There is, on our view, no parental right to 
confer advantage, or to have parent-child interactions that are properly protected 
(such as bedtime stories) rewarded in a way that conflicts with that principle. It is 
other, more general, considerations that generate the conflict. Like Macleod, we think 
                                                        
5 We consider the case with respect to fair equality of opportunity itself; if justice 
allowed inequalities of the kind licensed by something like Rawls’s difference 
principle, that case would be more straightforward.  
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that, compared both to conventional views and to the status quo in most affluent 
societies, the conflict between the family and fair equality of opportunity can be 
significantly mitigated – as indeed can the conflict between the family and other 
impartial distributive principles. Unlike him, we doubt that a just society could 
eliminate it altogether.  
 
Parenting and perfectionism  
Our book tries to tread a careful line on one of the most fundamental issues in 
political philosophy: whether it is proper for the state to act on judgments about the 
content of a good life, or whether it should aim rather to provide a just framework that 
remains neutral between them.6 Our theory as a whole certainly has mildly 
perfectionist elements but, as Christine Sypnowich (201x) observes, we are at pains to 
emphasize how much of the argument does not depend on them. From her avowedly 
perfectionist perspective, this looks like backsliding, and a missed opportunity:  our 
argument ‘makes it clear that political philosophy has been impoverished for its 
jettisoning of questions of human flourishing’ (xx); the faces exuding wellbeing in the 
Norman Rockwell painting on the cover need no anti-perfectionist caveats.7  
In this section we explain our reluctance to be cast as flag bearers for 
perfectionism, and try to clarify where perfectionist elements do indeed play a role in 
the argument. While we are readier to disown those elements than she would like, she 
is quicker to see them than we think warranted. The justification of policies aimed at 
                                                        
6 Here we follow Sypnowich in using ‘neutralist’ and ‘anti-perfectionist’ 
synonymously. There is of course a considerable literature on the relation between the 
two, and particularly on whether anti-perfectionism is indeed ‘neutral’. We try to 
sidestep that wider issue. 
7 In fact some readers have objected to our cover, variously because the family 
depicted is American, mono-ethnic, white, heterosexual, patriarchal, and carnivorous. 
Here we are thinking about the objection that, however wonderful the form of life 
shown, it is not the state’s business to be promoting it. 
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promoting or supporting family life is a very important topic, so it matters to have a 
clear picture of the structure of the issues. By setting out our version of that picture, 
we hope at least to enable those who disagree with us to understand where, and why, 
they do so. 
We downplay the importance of the perfectionist strands in the argument for 
two reasons (Brighouse and Swift 2014, pp. 178-181). On the one hand, we don’t 
want convinced anti-perfectionists to dismiss our views on the mistaken assumption 
that they are irredeemably and entirely perfectionist. Generally, whatever one’s 
conclusions, one wants arguments that are austere, appealing to premises that are no 
more controversial than necessary. In so far as we can articulate a theory of the value 
of the family, and of its implications for policy, without appealing to judgments that 
some will reject outright and others will regard as inappropriate bases for political 
action, we would want to do that. It is a very good question exactly how much of our 
theory does indeed survive, as a contribution to political theory, without those bases, 
and one that we hope the following discussion will better enable us, and others, to 
answer. 
On the other hand, we feel the force of neutralist considerations. Sypnowich 
thinks that our sympathetic characterization of anti-perfectionism ‘caricatures’ (xx) 
perfectionist views, but we stand by it (2014, p.178). Even a mild, pluralistic 
perfectionism like ours does indeed use the coercive power of the state, if only 
through tax and subsidy, on behalf of some ways of living rather than others, and 
there are various difficult questions – e.g. about the state’s capacity to make those 
judgments well, or about what constitutes equal respect for citizens – that make us 
less ready than her simply to assume the propriety of perfectionist state action. The 
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case for neutralism is, we believe, powerful enough for us to want to show how much 
of our argument would continue to apply if it were valid. 
Sypnowich thinks that we invoke perfectionist arguments in our case for the 
value of familial relationships for both children and parents (xxx). While the weighty 
and non-substitutable interest in parenting that we identify does indeed claim to 
specify an element in a flourishing life for many adults, we are not convinced that the 
account of children’s interests to which we appeal violates an anti-perfectionist 
constraint. And even if our full account of why children need parents does violate it, it 
remains important to see that even neutralists can accept child-centred arguments for 
the family – and for the ‘relationship goods’ it produces.  
We appeal to five interests of children to justify the family (and ground the 
child’s right to a parent): four of these relate to various aspects of children’s 
development (physical, cognitive, emotional, and moral), the fifth concerns the 
quality of their childhood as such (Brighouse and Swift 2014, p.64).8 We shall not 
repeat here how the argument goes, though we will stress that the interrelationships 
between the interests are crucial. For current purposes, what’s important is that three 
of these interests satisfy anti-perfectionist criteria in a very straightforward way: even 
neutralists can and do think it a proper task for the state to help future citizens develop 
their physical, cognitive and moral capacities. Emotional development is perhaps a 
little more controversial, but we deliberately specify it very broadly and, importantly, 
give no special place to the development of the capacity for distinctively familial 
                                                        
8 Sypnowich misunderstands our use of Nussbaum’s list of the constituents of well-
being (Brighouse and Swift 2014, p.60), which is invoked not ‘to say that children 
have a right to parents who are best placed to provide them with these goods’ (x) but 
simply to introduce and illustrate the idea of interests. 
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relationships.9 Perhaps some variants of anti-perfectionism would regard even this as 
beyond the pale, but we suspect that more plausible versions will either accept it as 
appropriately neutral between conceptions of wellbeing or see it as presupposed by 
the kind of interest (e.g. in framing, revising and pursuing a conception of the good, 
or in acting on one’s sense of justice) that neutralists can endorse. Childhood goods 
are an interesting case. In so far as they are valuable on these other developmental 
grounds, they too are presupposed. Where they are intrinsically valuable, the fact that 
anti-perfectionists are primarily concerned with people’s attributes as adults leaves 
their status unclear to us. Perhaps it is impossible to have an anti-perfectionist 
understanding of a good childhood – any such understanding will rest on a fuller 
theory of human flourishing than the neutralist can accept. Or perhaps common sense 
understandings of such a childhood do not violate anti-perfectionist strictures. 
Whatever one thinks about this last issue, we believe that familial 
relationships of the kind we describe are justified even by appeal to what we might 
call children’s ‘neutral interests’. At times Sypnowich seems to conflate paternalism 
and perfectionism, detecting exceptions to neutralism where none exist; even the 
resolute anti-perfectionist can recognize that children differ from adults in ways that 
justify the paternalistic treatment of the former but not the latter (p.x). Similarly, one 
should not read all talk of providing children with an upbringing that is conducive to 
their flourishing as betraying perfectionist leanings. On our understanding, the anti-
perfectionist can hold that the state - and perhaps even parents - are properly guided 
by a concern that children live flourishing lives, and can act paternalistically towards 
that end, provided that that concern does not take a determinate view about what 
                                                        
9 ‘Children need the education and upbringing that enables them to understand their 
own emotional needs and dispositions, regulate their emotional life, and connect 
emotionally with other people’ (Brighouse and Swift 2014, p.64). 
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counts as flourishing. The capacity for autonomy, for example, can be an appropriate 
guide to political action, even to the neutralist, partly because of its connection to 
flourishing, if those who have it are best placed to judge wherein their own 
flourishing consists.  
Where children’s interest in being parented can, we believe, generate the case 
for familial relationships of the kind that we describe without violating anti-
perfectionist constraints, our articulation of adults’ interest in being parents does take 
us into avowedly perfectionist territory – at least when we argue that it can properly 
guide state policy. Where the rights of parents (a.k.a. ‘parents’ rights’) are justified 
entirely by appeal to children’s interests, which could be construed in neutralist terms, 
the right to parent depends on a claim about the weighty and non-substitutable 
contribution to adults’ wellbeing made by a rather particular kind of relationship: one 
in which the adult acts as the child’s fiduciary and successfully discharges her 
fiduciary duties by having an intimate-but-authoritative loving relationship with the 
child.10 When we argue that society should support adults in their attempts to become 
parents, indeed when we argue that those adults who are good enough parents have an 
interest that defeats a child’s claim to the best available parent, we are invoking a 
perfectionist claim about the value of parenting. That claim, indeed, is unusually fully 
specified. Not only do we, unlike (e.g.) Nussbaum, regard parenting as sui generis – 
rather than subsumable into the general category of emotional life – which might 
already be enough to violate some neutralist constraints; we also offer a very specific 
articulation of the value of parenting, and one that others have seen much to quarrel 
with (see, for example, Reshef 2013, and Ferracioli 2016, 2017). 
                                                        
10 Notice that this is more determinate and specific than the interest in connecting 
emotionally with other people that we regard as among those developmental interests 
of children that it is parents’ duty to protect and promote.  
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As in our previous remarks, it is important, however, to see that the case for 
regarding familial relationship goods as distribuenda, and for advocating policies – 
flexible working arrangements, home visits, even workshops on reading bedtime 
stories (x) – aiming at their more equal distribution does not depend entirely on 
adults’ interest in in parenting, or in parenting well. Certainly, we believe that those 
interests may legitimately be taken into account by policymakers, but we would be 
disappointed if readers came away with the impression that they play a crucial role in 
that strand of our argument. Policies of that kind can often be justified by appeal to 
children’s ‘neutral’ interests. To parent is to play a fiduciary role for one’s children; to 
parent well is to do that well.  The case for more equal distributions of familial 
relationship goods, or indeed for distributions meeting sufficientarian desiderata, 
depends primarily on the claims of children. We could, to be sure, formulate the case 
in terms of the distribution of opportunities for flourishing, as Sypnowich urges us to, 
but we have suggested that doing so need involve no perfectionist commitments. 
Claims in favour of state support for artificial reproductive technology, or of giving 
adults’ interests any weight in the design of adoption policies, are different. Those do 
appeal to a specific view about adult wellbeing of the kind that she would like to see 
more of. 
 
Sharing and shaping values 
In Family Values we tackle the question of the extent to which parents may 
legitimately share their values with, and shape the values of, their children. This is 
obviously an area where the will of parents and the interests of children are 
potentially in conflict. We argue that, for several familiar reasons, children have an 
interest in becoming autonomous adults – equipped with the intellectual and 
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emotional resources to make and, over time, rationally to revise, considered and 
careful judgments about what values should guide their lives, and about what to do in 
particular circumstances. Society has an interest in children being constrained not 
only by the law but by internalized dispositions to treat others justly, honestly and 
with respect. But parents normally seek, and may well have an interest in, sharing 
their lives with their children, in ways that inevitably end up shaping those children’s 
values. Shaping values while fostering autonomy is not necessarily impossible, but it 
certainly creates a potential for tension. 
Daniel Weinstock (201x) observes that the subtitle of our book is ‘The Ethics 
of Parent-Child Relationships’ and argues that we also need a political philosophy of 
parent-child relationships. Social institutions that supplement the family can address 
the tensions between the parental will to shape values and the child’s interest in 
autonomy; schools in particular should play a major role in fostering autonomy. 
Andrée-Anne Cormier’s paper (201x) also concerns this conflict. Whereas Sypnowich 
urges us to be more, or more openly, perfectionist, Cormier pursues a version of the 
argumentative strategy suggested above: parents’ deliberately shaping their children’s 
values in the light of their comprehensive views can sometimes be justified by appeal 
to children’s ‘neutral’ interest in developing autonomy, so does not violate any anti-
perfectionist constraint.  
We find Cormier’s paper elegant and congenial. Much of it is a critique of 
Matthew Clayton’s view on these issues, and we look forward to his response. But 
reflecting on her anti-perfectionist defence of our position has led us to identify some 
lack of clarity in one aspect of the view as presented in our book.11 In Family Values 
we argue that parents have an obligation to shape some of their children’s values – 
                                                        
11 We owe our awareness of this possible difficulty also, and separately, to Norvin 
Richards (2016) and discussion with Matthew Clayton. 
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those that will enable and incline them to treat others justly, and to behave well as 
citizens. This obligation, and the content of the values, is entirely independent of the 
values that parents distinctively hold. But parents also have a limited right to shape 
their children’s values in ways that reflect their own. The right is limited primarily by 
a concern for the child’s interest in developing autonomy, the facilitation of which is 
also a parental obligation. That right is our focus here. The argument we present 
grounds the right in familial relationship goods and appeals primarily to the 
importance, for children, of parents’ being free to be spontaneously intimate and to 
share themselves with their child: part of feeling free to be spontaneous is not 
engaging in the excessive self-monitoring that would be required to shield the child 
from all one’s interests and values. But we also defend some deliberate shaping of 
children’s values, where that is necessary for the development and maintenance – 
including maintenance into adulthood - of an intimate familial relationship. Such a 
relationship requires at least some shared distinctive values, which in the early part of 
childhood, at least, will typically come from the adult.  
Cormier argues that this second, deliberate, class of value-shaping can be 
defended on anti-perfectionist grounds where it is necessary for the kind of familial 
relationship that is itself conducive to children’s developmental interests, most 
notably their interest in developing autonomy. She thinks that children would 
retrospectively consent to having their values deliberately shaped where that is the 
case. Indeed, she canvasses the further possibility that parents’ enrolling children into 
their own comprehensive doctrines may itself be defended in this way.  
To clarify the issues raised by her paper, note that there are key differences, 
some of which are obscured rather than clarified by our discussion in the book 
(Brighouse and Swift 2014, pp. 154-157), between (i) parents’ spontaneously 
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sharing/revealing their values, (ii) parents’ deliberately sharing/revealing their values, 
and (iii) parents’ deliberately aiming to influence their children’s values. Taking one’s 
child to church can be a deliberate way of introducing them to a belief system and a 
set of practices that one judges valuable and wants to share with one’s children but, in 
principle at least, it need not involve any attempt deliberately to influence the values 
they come to hold; it need not be a deliberate attempt to get them to endorse 
Christianity. It is, to be sure, deliberate rather than spontaneous. But the aim is, or can 
be, merely that of revealing who one is to - sharing one’s enthusiasms with - one’s 
children. There need be no intention to guarantee, or even to increase the likelihood 
of, their coming to endorse those values. 
Of course, all these classes of parent-child interaction will have the effect of 
shaping children’s values. And even in class (ii), the parent might presumably hope 
that the child will come to endorse the values that the parent is revealing to her. 
Indeed, as Weinstock emphasizes, one may worry about the autonomy-inhibiting 
impact of all three classes, with serious repercussions for the parental duty of care to 
facilitate children’s autonomy. But, bracketing that concern, the difficult question 
raised by Cormier’s argument concerns which of them can be really be justified by 
appeal to familial relationship goods and the developmental interests that they serve. 
How should we think about cases of the kind she describes here?: 
For some parents – perhaps especially religiously committed parents – 
comprehensively enrolling their children, e.g. by baptizing them, bringing 
them to church and teaching them the value of things like spirituality, or 
family ties, or love, as they understand it in light of their religious view, may 
not only be an important source of fulfillment and joy, but also a key and 
indispensible element of what it means for them to be authentic in building a 
connection with their children. (xx)  
 
One might consider a parent who can only connect authentically with her child by 
engaging in these kinds of interaction to have misunderstood the duties of parenthood. 
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That would be analogous to our view that a parent who cuts off relations with a child 
who rejects the parent’s religion has misunderstood her role (Brighouse and Swift 
2014, p.157). In such cases, familial relationship goods are at the mercy of whatever 
parents need to connect authentically with their children, which may be true 
empirically but is problematic as a justification of the interaction. We can indeed 
imagine a child saying to her parent: ‘I understand why you brought me up to believe 
in the Bible. Given your beliefs, that was the only way for us to have the kind of close 
loving relationship I needed to have with you if I was going to develop the autonomy 
I am now able to exercise (and which I exercise by rejecting Christianity)’. But it is 
hard not to think that there is something wrong with the parents’ beliefs in that case. 
Just as, on our view, parents can enjoy loving familial relationships with their children 
without acting on their entirely natural desire generally to confer (unjustly 
advantageous) benefits on them, so, perhaps, they can enjoy such relationships 
without acting on their desire, perhaps also entirely natural, to try to get their children 
to endorse the same values as them. A fuller exploration of these issues would – we 
hope will – take another paper, exploring, in addition to the distinctions set out above, 
the differences between (a) revealing one’s values, (b) getting one’s children to 
participate in practices implied by those values, and (c) attempting to influence the 
values that one’s children endorse, whether during their childhoods or as the adults 
they will become.  
In the book we frequently deploy a distinction between what people should be 
permitted to do qua parents, on family values grounds, and what they should be 
permitted to do all things considered. To the frustration of those quite reasonably 
interested in the latter issue, our focus is the former; we are concerned specifically 
with those parent-child interactions that are ‘susceptible to justification by appeal to 
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the parent-child relationship’ (Brighouse and Swift 2014, p.146).12 So it is not 
altogether surprising that our theory supports only a right to do those things that are 
necessary in order for the relationship to flourish. Still, the amount of sharing that is 
necessary might be considerable. And it is worth remembering that a good deal of 
deliberate value-shaping – that required to ensure that the children will grow up with 
a sense of justice – is obligatory. Success in that value-shaping task probably takes a 
good deal of intimacy and connectedness between parents and children, especially in 
social contexts where justice values are not well supported by the broader, extra-
familial, environment: the showing of examples, modelling of behaviour, and 
exposure to other models of behaviour, might be more effective in the context of 
shared ‘discretionary’ valuing. And, as long as it is consistent with the development 
of the child’s autonomy, more sharing, and perhaps even intentional shaping, might 
be legitimate on other grounds that we do not consider.  
Weinstock notes that our commitment to the prospective autonomy of the 
child limits the ways in which parents may deliberately shape their children’s values, 
and even the spontaneity with which they may share them. He takes us to hold that 
parents should not ‘exert emotional pressure’ on their children, pointing out that: 
a parent who in the presence of her children displays enthusiasm and passion 
in engaging in the activities that she finds valuable is, by this very fact, 
exerting emotional pressure upon her children. If her relationship with her 
children is healthy, then they will tend to be emotionally disposed to find 
pleasing the things their parents take pleasure in. When parents act on this 
disposition, whether they do so intentionally or not, they are exercising 
emotional pressure. And yet they are doing something that would seem to be 
called for by the theory of familial intimacy under discussion. (xx) 
 
We agree, and say so (Brighouse and Swift 2014, pp.172-173). Our claim about 
emotional pressure is specifically that the complex and burdensome duty that parents 
                                                        
12 Brighouse and Swift (2015) offers further clarification of the specificity of our 
concerns. 
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are under with respect to value sharing and value-shaping includes ‘restraining 
themselves from exerting the emotional pressure that they may be tempted 
deliberately to impose on the child to refrain from revising her received 
commitments’ (173). Some degree of pressure is indeed surely unavoidable. When it 
comes to a love of cricket, or an enthusiasm for hip-hop music, it is not at all hard to 
imagine a parent who sincerely and in good faith will not have the slightest 
disappointment if her child fails to come to share that love or enthusiasm. But that 
attitude is more difficult to adopt in the case of religious or political values and 
commitments. And even in the former case, even emotionally well-balanced children 
may well anticipate, contrary to fact, that rejection of the enthusiasm will provoke 
disappointment.  
Weinstock (xx) claims that ‘this juggling act between intimacy and autonomy’ 
is not required of families: 
We need not look to just one institution, such as the family, as the sine qua 
non of the child’s autonomy. We need not impose upon it the responsibility of 
ensuring that the children that are raised within it are raised autonomously. 
Nor do we need to overtax the state’s capacity by requiring that in the name of 
the autonomy of children it observe the ways in which they are raised by 
parents in the intimate sphere. Nor need the state stand ready to intervene in 
that sphere when children are subject to value-shaping which, though it cannot 
be qualified as brainwashing or rank manipulation, may perhaps be viewed as 
excessive from the point of view of a parenting ethics that requires of parents 
that they attend both to ensuring that familial relations are characterized by the 
requisite degree of intimacy, and that it be a locus for the teaching of 
autonomous-decision-making. 
 
The solution, for him, lies in state-regulated, autonomy-promoting schools. These 
need not teach the value of autonomy directly; it is enough that they meet the negative 
condition of ‘not simply being extensions of the values around which the familial 
domain is organized’ (xx). 
Again, we agree with much of this; we never suggest that it is parents’ 
responsibility, on their own, to ensure their children’s autonomy. Indeed, one of us 
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(Brighouse 1998, 2005, 2006) has argued extensively that schools play a valuable, 
maybe essential, role in facilitating children’s autonomy, even for families that are 
entirely committed to their children’s autonomy, and that a key feature of an 
autonomy-facilitating school will be an ethos which is somewhat ‘discontinuous’ 
from that of the home and the mainstream culture. It is through schooling that the 
state is most easily able to supply the raw materials needed for autonomy: through the 
curriculum and high quality instruction children can experience intellectual and 
emotional encounters with ideas, values, and traditions that are different from, and 
sometimes conflict with, those they are raised with in the home. Perhaps more 
importantly, in a socially and culturally diverse school they can become acquainted 
with different ideas, values and traditions through the friendships they make and 
through intimate interactions with their friends’ families. A culturally diverse teaching 
force can provide children with a range of adult role models who are unlike them and 
whom they can come to admire. A robust and well-designed extra-curriculum can 
lead them to discover enthusiasms and interests that would never have been 
stimulated by their home culture. 
Still, we sound a couple of notes of caution. The first is simply that one should 
not overestimate the state’s capacity to provide the kind of schooling that will 
facilitate autonomy, even for children whose parents are not hostile to it, let alone for 
those whose parents resist their development as independent persons. In any society 
that values autonomy, consumer choice is likely to play a considerable role in the 
allocation of various goods, including housing and schooling, and markets are liable 
to play a large role in the allocation of jobs. This can make it very difficult to achieve 
a mix of cultures within schools, either among the staff or among the students, 
especially (but not only) in areas with lower population density. Even when cultural 
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diversity among the student population is achieved, children’s tendency to prefer to 
socialize with others who pretty much like them makes it difficult to harness that 
diversity as an aid to autonomy, which may often reasonably be a lesser priority than 
improving students’ academic outcomes. Teachers tend to mirror the general 
population in terms of their political, religious, and cultural outlooks, so it is not 
surprising that in many schools the ethos is not at all discontinuous with the culture of 
that of most of the homes of the students who attend. Equipping teachers with the 
skills necessary for teaching basic mathematics, science, and reading is already a 
difficult task. Equipping them to enable children to reflect critically and well not only 
on the values they have been raised with but also on the, possibly autonomy-eroding, 
values that permeate the mainstream ethos of modern capitalist societies – which 
many of those teachers unreflectively endorse – is more challenging still. 
The second note of caution is that, however useful a political philosophy of 
parent-child relationships might be, an ethics of parent-child relationships remains 
essential. Even high quality schooling for autonomy would not eliminate the ‘juggling 
act between intimacy and autonomy’ that Weinstock seems to think that we can avoid 
requiring of families. Parents who are determined to resist autonomy can adopt 
strategies to immunize their children from the autonomy-promoting lessons and 
experiences that the school provides. Those strategies may sometimes fail, but they 
will succeed often enough for parents’ choices about how to respond to schools’ 
attempts to promote critical reflection on the values they themselves hold to remain 
important. Even where parents make no deliberate attempts at immunization, the 
emotional pull of their parents’ enthusiasms will be enough to prevent many children 
from responding to the schools’ messages. This is especially likely if parents take the 
awareness that another institution is taking care of autonomy as entitling them to be 
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completely uninhibited in their promotion of their own values. And because, as 
Weinstock acknowledges, it is important that schools not damage healthy familial 
relationships, the autonomy-promoting role of schools itself places limits on what 
parents may teach children at home. So consider the parents who, thinking themselves 
freed from the responsibility for promoting their child’s autonomy by the presence of 
an autonomy-facilitating school, teach her that homosexuality, or apostasy, are sins 
punishable by eternal damnation. One can easily imagine that what the school would 
have to do to facilitate that child’s autonomy would interfere with the familial 
relationship. We see no way that parents can be relieved of the duty to participate 
conscientiously in developing their child’s autonomy.  
If that is right, then we have to accept that parents have obligations that the 
state cannot enforce. We agree with Weinstock (xx) that ‘the line distinguishing 
acceptable from unacceptable kinds of value-forming would simply escape states’ 
epistemic capacity, even for states that had eschewed liberal democratic concerns 
with excessive surveillance of its citizenry’. For us, the importance of intimacy within 
the parent-child relationships means that parents must be given space within which 
they can, in fact, fail to deliver on their duties. We do not see a way around this. 
 
Procreation and childhood 
We hardly discuss procreation in Family Values. We argue that adults have an interest 
in parenting, explain what that interest consists in, and claim that it is weighty enough 
to support a prima facie right to parent. We assume a continuing supply of children 
needing parents, and that childhood is a natural biological condition with the 
properties that enable adults to realize the interest in parenting, and through which all 
human beings lucky enough to reach adulthood will pass. But we do not even argue 
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that procreation is ever justified, all things considered. If, for example, we agreed with 
David Benatar (2008) that most lives are not worth living, because they contain more 
bad than good for the people living them, we would think that was a strong reason for 
most people not to procreate, despite the interest in parenting. We do not agree with 
him about that. More particularly, because we do not claim that the adult interest in 
parenting includes the interest in parenting a genetic descendent, we do not argue that 
adults are justified in procreating in order to fulfil their own interest in parenting. 
Sarah Hannan and R.J. Leland are therefore not criticizing us directly when 
they challenge the view that the interest in parenting is strong enough to establish a 
right to procreate. But their argument is implicitly critical of us for the tacit 
assumptions we make about childhood: that it is a stage of life, that is usually, or at 
least often, well worth experiencing and going through. This gives us an opportunity 
to discuss further the nature of childhood, and its relationship to the interest in 
parenting. 
Hannan and Leland observe that for adults to fulfil the interest we describe in 
parenting a child they need to be supplied with beings with certain features: viz, 
impaired practical reason, a need for extensive parental control, profound and 
asymmetric vulnerability, and no established practical identity. We agree. Hannan and 
Leland claim, though, that these are bad-making features of a life and, in particular, 
that possessing these features is bad for children.  Because they are bad for children, 
the adult interest in relationships with beings that possess these features cannot form 
the basis of a justification for procreation, let alone of a right to procreate. But we 
think several responses are available to someone who, unlike us, wanted to use the 
adult interest to play that justificatory role. 
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The first would be to concede that the features of childhood to which they 
point are, indeed, bad, but observe that the parent’s job is to deliver children from that 
condition. On this view it would be a matter of good fortune that the purportedly bad-
making features of childhood make parenting distinctively rewarding, because this 
gives children a reasonably reliable way of escaping it. We give considerable 
emphasis to the interest parents have in raising children to become autonomous, 
independent adults, and the distinctive challenge posed by that particular task. For 
adults to enjoy the goods of parenting, those who are parented must have the capacity, 
if the role is discharged only reasonably well, to develop into adults whose practical 
reasoning is mature, who no longer need parental control and are no longer 
profoundly or asymmetrically vulnerable and who have a well-developed practical 
identity. An important part of what it is to realize the interest in parenting is to 
oversee the child’s development to this adult state. Parenting, on our stipulation, is not 
a matter of caring for someone who lacks the capacity to develop into an adult: the 
role is to oversee that development.  
As they figure in our account of the value of parenting, the purportedly bad-
making features of childhood are, then, temporary, transient and necessary steps on 
the path to adulthood. So creating a child whom one knows will have these 
purportedly bad-making features with the reasonable expectation that they will be 
transcended through the process of parenting is quite different from producing a child 
that one knows will never develop into adulthood, and that one will control it for all 
of its life. To do that would indeed be to treat those features of childhood that make it 
bad for children as one’s reason for procreation. But the interest in parenting is not 
simply an interest in exploiting the bad-for-children properties for one’s own sake. It 
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is an interest in being the person who has the kind of relationship with the child that 
serves his interest in becoming an adult.  
A second, and related, response would insist that, for us, the adult interest in 
parenting is misunderstood if it is conceived primarily as an interest in having control 
over another being, or in having another being dependent on oneself. Its core is an 
interest in a particular kind of loving relationship: a unique combination of intimacy 
and fiduciary authority. It is what children need from parents if they are to develop 
into adults that makes parenting distinctively and importantly valuable for adults. 
Children need ‘a special kind of relationship – a relationship in which the adults 
offers love and authority, a complex and emotionally challenging combination of 
openness and restraint, of spontaneity and self-monitoring, of sharing and 
withholding. It’s that kind of relationship that adults have an interest in too’ (original 
emphasis Brighouse and Swift 2014, p.93). Anyone who parents, or procreates, 
simply so that she can exercise control over a dependent has got something very badly 
wrong.  
But we want to respond a bit more forcefully by doubting that the features of 
childhood that make a parental relationship with a child valuable for adults are, in 
fact, bad for children. On the contrary, we suggest that these are good-making 
features, both for the child during her childhood and for the adult she will become. 
It would be nice to frame our discussion of these features in terms of the 
‘childhood goods’ or the ‘special’ or ‘intrinsic’ goods of childhood that they make 
possible (Brennan 2014; Gheaus 2015a, 2015b). We lack, alas, the control to do that 
well, partly because we are not yet clear on how that category is best understood. Are 
they those features and goods, possessed by or available to children but not adults, 
that are intrinsically valuable for children – i.e. good for children during their 
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childhoods, irrespective of any instrumental or developmental benefits? The test for 
those would be to consider whether someone who died on the cusp of adulthood had 
benefitted from having the properties in question. Or are they those features and 
goods, possessed by or available to children, but not adults, that are valuable for 
people to have as children because they make possible the kind of development that is 
good for the adults they become? In practice, we suspect, many such properties and 
goods are both; for example, it is good for adults that they were unselfconsciously 
playful as children – it enabled the kind of development that benefitted them as adults 
– but unselfconscious playfulness is ‘intrinsically’ good for children too (i.e. it is good 
for them even if they are not lucky enough to live to become the adults who would 
have benefitted from being playful children).  
That said, let’s start with dependence on another person for having one’s 
needs met and the necessity of parental control. After a long period of independence 
such a situation might indeed be undignified, or frustrating. But for a child, at the 
beginning of a full life, it enables her to enjoy experiences that would otherwise be 
unavailable or, perhaps, only insecurely available. Children can be – and many are, at 
least in reasonably favourable circumstances – carefree in a way that adults typically 
cannot. That experience – of going through a day without worrying about one’s own 
future, one’s responsibilities to others, the horrors one will encounter in the world 
beyond – is precious, and is facilitated by being in the state of vulnerability that 
makes one need loving, caring, and stable parental control. One of the reasons, 
furthermore, why that experience is so rare in adulthood is that our established 
practical identities involve us in a web of mutual responsibility; for the flourishing 
adult who relates successfully to others’ carefreeness must be rare and fleeting, 
precisely because it is a holiday from her practical identity. 
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Like dependence, children’s being ‘primed’ for spontaneous and unconditional 
trust and love enables them to enjoy experiences that are unavailable later in life, once 
one has got the measure of the world and all its possible disappointments. The child 
who, without self-consciousness and with complete spontaneity, dances when a parent 
returns from a short trip and then throws himself into a hug is experiencing something 
distinctively valuable that is only possible due to the character of his love. 
Now think about the alleged defect of lacking an established practical identity. 
This feature of childhood is a precondition for the good of developing an established 
practical identity. As children and adolescents we undergo a large and complex 
variety of learning experiences, including the gradual discovery of what our interests 
are, of what we are truly like, of what other people are like and how to read them 
well, of intense bouts of friendship some of which, even if brief, have lifelong impacts 
on us, of discovery of features of the world that are fascinating, or dreary, or sublime. 
Throughout childhood we have innumerable learning experiences, some distressing, 
many challenging, and many more intensely rewarding (including many of those that 
are also distressing and challenging). These all contribute to the development of a 
practical identity and would be different, and in many cases less valuable, experiences 
if we already had one. In adulthood we (usually, more or less) know who we are and 
allow our interests and identities to filter out important features of the natural and 
social world. We wear blinkers because we are no longer embarked on a journey of 
discovery while mapping the world and finding our place in it; though revising our 
views of course remains possible, as adults what we are usually doing is more like 
finding and following directions to where we want to go. That experience – the 
mapping of the world – is impossible if we already have an established practical 
identity.  
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Try to think, now, about the alternative: entering the world with an established 
practical identity. In fact, as we’ll suggest later, we’re not sure we can make sense of 
this possibility for beings like us. But in so far as we can, the established practical 
identity would have to be given, either by some creator, or by nature. In either case, 
there is an important sense in which it would not be ours. Our practical identities 
become ours – and established as ours – through a process in which we experience 
and interact with countless environmental influences and other persons, some of 
which touch us profoundly, others of which barely touch us, and many of which fall 
somewhere in between. Exactly how each interaction influences us is affected by 
what else has happened, by what the other influences have been and will be, and by 
the character of our, particular, embodied, emerging practical identity. What enables 
us to be autonomous is that our practical identities are not given by a creator, by our 
parents,e or by nature, but develop and are established through childhood and into 
adulthood, as well as being revised through our adult lives.13    
Even impaired practical reason is valuable. Patrick Tomlin (2016) amusingly 
speculates that we might feel sorry for children because they are both so pleased, and 
so upset, by things that just do not matter. But while we would – and do – indeed feel 
sorry for adults afflicted with that tendency, we are inclined rather to envy children’s 
capacity to be so affected by trivial things. To be so readily distressed might, taken on 
its own, be regrettable, even for a child, but to be so easily thrilled and joyful seems to 
us fortunate. To be sure, there might be children who are so quickly prone to 
excessive emotional reactions that they would be better off on a more even keel – if 
only because such a disposition is tiring and liable to get in the way of other valuable 
elements in their lives. But, assuming that the capacity for irrational suffering and joy 
                                                        
13 For a related view see Weinstock (2016), which we inexcusably came across too 
late to learn from in this paper. 
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come together as a package, we are generally inclined to envy children their capacity 
rather than feel sorry for them. 
Somebody might object that we romanticize childhood – either here, or in our 
book. But we don’t. Childhood is marked by features that are valuable at that stage in 
life, both because they make possible valuable experiences during childhood and 
because they are developmentally valuable; we have particularly emphasized the 
development that makes our established practical identities our own. But, of course, 
the valuable experiences and development these features facilitate depend on the 
cooperation of the world. Being dependent on adults for one’s wellbeing is bad for 
you if no adult cares to, and is competent to, look after you. The seriously impaired 
rationality of a toddler can be disastrous in a world of unfenced precipices and 
inattentive adults.  
A final comment. It is tempting to think about the issue of whether childhood 
is bad for children by asking whether it would be better for human beings to emerge 
into the world as fully formed adults. Hannan and Leland invite this question with 
their example of Dr. Frankensteen’s creation, Monstra. Monstra could have been 
created as a fully formed adult, but Frankensteen chose instead to endow her with a 
nature such that she would go through a lengthy period of child-like dependence in 
order to provide him with a parent-like experience. 
In so far as we can make sense of the question we don’t think it would be 
better for human beings to emerge into the world as fully formed adults. But we resist 
the question. As our discussion above indicates, we are not sure what it would mean 
to be an agent, or to have an established practical identity, if one emerged into the 
world as an adult. Human beings – the kinds of beings for which all of the resources 
of moral theorizing that we know of have been developed – are organic. They emerge 
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into the world helpless, and their development into adulthood involves physical, 
cognitive, and emotional growth in an appropriately nurturing and cooperative 
environment. They enter adulthood endowed with knowledge, skills, dispositions, 
attitudes, relationships and memories that have developed over the course of their 
childhood through interactions with the world beyond their bodies. These attributes, 
including the relationships and memories, are not incidental to their selves, but partly 
constitutive of them. While we have played along with the thought that persons might 
be able to avoid childhood and its purportedly bad-making features for the sake of 
arguing that those features are not, in fact, bad, we are not sure that we can really 
make sense of it.  
 
Conclusion 
It’s true that we have more to say. But we make no pretense that only considerations 
of space have prevented us from providing better responses to the six papers 
assembled in this special issue. We have been given much to ponder, and have been 
prompted to engage with difficult and complex issues, some of which had been more 
or less consciously sidestepped or pushed under the carpet, some of which had never 
occurred to us. Properly to engage with the full range of questions raised by our 
critics will take not only more words but also a good deal more work. We are 
extremely grateful to all the contributors, both for their careful attention and for 
pressing us to wade into deeper waters. We hope to come up with more satisfactory 
answers in due course. 
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